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INTRODUCTION 
Before the Depression made the prospect of federal intervention in economic affairs 
feasible, moral reformers had spent decades making the idea of governmental—first local, 
later federal—intervention in personal affairs desirable. Before organizations like the 
American Federation of Labor sought governmental protection from the ills of capitalism, 
groups like the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice fought for governmental 
protection from the dangers of hedonism. Before Congress delivered the National 
Industrial Recovery Act or the Agricultural Adjustment Act, it passed the Federal Lottery 
Act and the White Slave Traffic Act. And before the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of 
the Commerce Clause to shape the market, it endorsed using it—along with the Postal and 
Taxation Clauses, too—to mold society. Before, that is to say, America had a regulatory 
state, it had a vice state—a national regime geared toward preventing, regulating, and 
punishing “immoral” behavior. 
As Kyle G. Volk, John W. Compton, and Jessica R. Pliley deftly illustrate in their 
respective first books, the political, constitutional, and legal roots of this vice state, fully 
realized and entrenched in the decades prior to the New Deal, are deep, multifaceted, and 
interwoven. They span nearly a century, from the Age of Andrew Jackson to the heart of 
the Progressive Era. They encompass policy domains from alcohol to gambling to 
                                                          
       *    Associate Professor of Political Science, Williams College.  
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prostitution. They involve actors ranging from preachers to judges, legislators to law 
enforcement. Considered collectively, Volk, Compton, and Pliley’s excavation of these 
roots offer a profoundly revisionist story of the modern American state as an entity that is 
set in motion well before Black Tuesday, concerned with a very different sort of 
governmental endeavor than price controls and labor standards, and legitimized less by the 
needs of the nation in the face of punctuated crisis than by an overarching vision of the 
good society against persistent threats to its moral fabric. 
Of course, an argument for repositioning the forces of sin, vice, and iniquity as 
central in American life is hardly new—in history, in religion, or in political science.1 
What makes these books stand out—certainly in conjunction with one another, but to some 
degree in isolation as well—is the staggering diversity and intensity of moral politics they 
describe. Going beyond a mere shared conception that constructions of morality and 
immorality have been inextricably linked to claims about American political well-being or 
democratic survival, what Volk, Compton, and Pliley provide is a fascinating glimpse into 
the multiple avenues of practicing—both advocating and contesting—moral politics. 
MORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
The most sprawling of the three books is easily Kyle G. Volk’s Moral Minorities 
and the Making of American Democracy. Temporally, the book is largely rooted in the 
immediate antebellum period—the 1840s and 1850s—but, topically, it ranges broadly 
from Sunday laws to liquor licensing to interracial marriage, showing in each case how, in 
an era of democratic expansion, minority rights became a fundamental part of participatory 
politics. In his telling of the counterintuitive turn to democracy to accomplish minority 
wishes, Volk presents a tale of moral politics through the people and delivers insight into 
the moral roots of modern political debates. 
With the simultaneous moralism and populism of the Jacksonian era as his backdrop, 
Volk situates the birth of “minority-rights politics” as a response to democratic, Christian 
attempts to regulate lives in ways that distinctly accorded with majoritarian sentiment.2 
According to the dominant logic of the era, the Sabbath should be observed vigilantly, 
liquor licenses should be issued rarely (if at all), and cross-racial interaction should be as 
limited as possible. But Volk’s concern is not so much with understanding the advocates 
of those propositions as with tracing the development of a resistance to them. That 
resistance, Volk recounts, was not merely against the content of the laws but against the 
idea, as ascendant then as ever before, that, in a democracy, it was the right of the majority 
to rule as it saw fit. In response, Volk’s protagonists—Jews and Catholics, immigrants and 
liquor dealers, abolitionists and black Northerners—powerfully articulated the idea that 
protecting minority rights was a “critical obligation of democratic government.”3 In doing 
so, Volk maintains, they “pioneered a tradition of political participation and minority-
rights advocacy that subsequent generations of activists would adopt.”4 
This newfound relevance of countermajoritarianism—this more “pluralistic 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2003). 
 2. KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 5. 
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conception of democracy” with minority rights viewed as integral to “moral freedom, 
cultural diversity, and social equality”—was not born of a single moment or a common 
cause.5 Rather, it was built across constituencies that did not necessarily see eye-to-eye 
with one another but at least shared a belief that those without power should not be 
subjected to an arbitrary or overzealous exercise of it. Whether Jews and Seventh Day 
Baptists objecting to the assumptions of a “Christian nation” implied by Sunday closing 
laws,6 liquor dealers and working-class drinkers chafing at direct democracy measures that 
limited alcohol consumption as intrusion into private spheres,7 or abolitionists criticizing 
racial separation (whether in marital vows, school classrooms, or in public transportation) 
as impeding the basic equality necessary to a flourishing democratic society,8 minorities 
of various stripes targeted public opinion and sought to shape public policy by mobilizing 
at the mass level, forming advocacy groups, and offering—publicly and loudly—rival 
conceptions of what real democracy entailed, expected, and required. The resultant 
minority-rights project, then, was at once one of ideational formation and grassroots 
organization—that is to say, about both articulating ideas and developing the networks 
essential to spreading them. In both ways, then, it was, as Volk recounts, a profoundly 
democratic endeavor. While the opponents of moral reform used whatever tools might 
have been available to them, they did not abandon the democratic sphere but enmeshed 
themselves more fully in it. They argued and demonstrated, petitioned and published, 
networked and coordinated. Evincing a “steadfast commitment to democracy, even in the 
face of persistent democratic oppression,” their efforts represented democratic action to 
texture democratic government.9 
And, at the end of the day, they made a difference, bringing forth from the golden 
age of American democracy not so much more democracy as a richer and more nuanced 
democracy. Minority rights, of course, were not a novel idea, with James Madison in 
particular having been deeply concerned with majoritarian will steamrolling minority 
interests as he drafted the blueprint for American government. But what Volk’s account 
shows is a transformation of those rights from ones narrowly protective of “propertied 
aristocrats, slaveholders, and intellectuals” to a “rallying cry of . . . socioeconomically 
diverse Americans.”10 Democracy, under that transformation, could be a system where the 
minority and majority alike could press their claims and fight for their rights. Even though 
majoritarian moral reformers—those opposed to alcohol, gambling, and prostitution—
would, over the next few decades, win more often than they lost, the establishment of the 
minority rights tradition would offer a powerful legacy for opponents to draw upon in 
resisting them. 
MORAL POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Where Volk opts for breadth of subject, John W. Compton offers a sharp challenge 
                                                          
 5. Id. at 6–7. 
 6. See id. at 37–68. 
 7. VOLK, supra note 2, at 69–100, 167–205. 
 8. See id. at 101–66. 
 9. Id. at 218. 
 10. Id. at 205. 
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to conventional understandings in The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution. The 
prevailing consensus that Compton targets, even if he only wades partially into the debate 
until the end of the book, concerns the “constitutional revolution” of 1937, with a reading 
and sources that cast entirely new light on the origins of that momentous change in 
American constitutionalism. Working his way through not only judicial decisions but also 
the religious developments that surrounded them, Compton demonstrates the peculiar turn 
to courts to accomplish majority values. In so doing, his rendering of mid to late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century jurisprudence as one of moral politics through judges offers a 
novel perspective on the moral roots of the modern constitutional order. 
At the heart of Compton’s puzzle—and, in some sense, his explanation for both the 
constitutional revolution and the rise of “living constitutionalism”—is a clash between 
“rapidly evolving mores, on the one hand, and the generally rigid principles and 
institutional structures of the constitutional order, on the other.”11 After all, while the 
moral convictions and sensibilities of any society should naturally be expected to change, 
that society’s formal constitution establishes an order and fixes its contours—not just for 
a period of time but, at least until it is replaced, for all time. Compton’s entry into this 
timeless political dilemma between dynamism and ballast is the period following the 
Second Great Awakening, when religious reawakening resulted in a shift of social mores 
toward immorality. Far from merely wishing to control “national sins” such as alcohol and 
gambling, post-Great Revival citizens sought to eradicate them completely.12 But in 
heeding a religious authority to rid the nation of vice, reformers encountered an obstacle 
in the form of the civic authority of a Constitution that was understood to subordinate 
“traditional moral and religious purposes to the worldly goals of protecting property and 
promoting economic development.”13 As a result, in order to pursue the America they 
imagined, reformers needed to redefine the constitutional commitments underpinning the 
America in which they lived. 
Where this clash—between those advocating measures for moral betterment and a 
document interpreted to allow for economic betterment—ultimately occurred most 
consequentially was in courtrooms, with state and federal judges alike charged with the 
“task of negotiating” the disjunct between the drive to “purge ‘national sins’” and “the 
ideals of the traditional order.”14 Surveying first the state and later the federal judicial 
landscape, Compton leads a jurisprudential tour of both geographic diversity and doctrinal 
instability. At first, as the mores of the Second Great Awakening made themselves 
manifest in law, judges were amenable only to the regulation of liquor and lotteries (the 
two primary subjects of Compton’s analysis), casting a far more skeptical eye at reformer-
pressed laws that sought to prohibit alcohol sales or gambling outright, which judges 
thought hostile to contractual and due process rights.15 But within a few decades—during 
which the Jacksonian party system effectively collapsed, opening up a new Republican 
Party that eagerly welcomed evangelical voters and rewarded their loyalty with judges 
                                                          
 11. JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 2 (2014). 
 12. Id. at 3. 
 13. Id. at 19. 
 14. Id. at 38, 51. 
 15. See id. at 52–72. 
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amenable to morals legislation16—both state appellate courts and the Supreme Court had 
given up resistance to moral reform.17 A previously firm attachment to the Contracts 
Clause was replaced by an expansive conception of the police power. The requisites of 
due process were massaged to align with the concession that private rights should not limit 
public power. The limitations on power authorized by the Commerce Clause were 
complicated by an understanding that the boundaries of the federal system were fluid 
rather than fixed. By the dawn of the century, the very institution that had always been the 
staunchest defender of the economic constitutional order had essentially abandoned the 
core principles of that order. 
Where exactly does the revisionist take on the constitutional revolution emerge in 
all this? Well, as it so happens (and as Compton describes in the last third of the book), 
when, following waves of intense opposition from (in sequence) Populists, Progressives, 
and labor in the first few decades of the twentieth century,18 the Supreme Court ultimately 
gave way to the demands of New Deal reformers in 1937, the legacy of moral reformers—
of vice regulation and the judicial approval given to it—was of critical importance.19 
Lawyers relied, as Compton details, on an idea that had been central to the liquor and 
lottery cases—namely, that “legal concepts and categories were inherently indeterminate 
and that traditional constitutional principles merely served to mask the judiciary’s 
subjective preference for laissez-faire economic policies.”20 And, after resisting through 
1936, the Court ultimately agreed, discarding its erstwhile attachment to economic rights, 
the system of dual federalism, and an assumption that the Constitution had fixed meaning 
regardless of the historical circumstances or the views of the public. Despite the fact that 
there has long been a robust debate about the reasons for and causal factors leading to the 
constitutional revolution, neither the original scholarship emphasizing external political 
forces21 nor the revisionist scholarship emphasizing internal legal forces22 has seen what 
Compton makes vivid here: the extent to which it was the Court’s embrace of vice 
regulation that laid the intellectual groundwork for the remaking of the constitutional 
universe. 
MORAL POLITICS AND LEGAL ENFORCEMENT 
If Volk’s book is characterized by its extensive scope and Compton’s defined by its 
incisive revisionism, then Jessica R. Pliley’s Policing Sexuality: The Mann Act and the 
Making of the FBI is marked by its eye-opening depth. Her focus on a single (albeit 
incredibly troubled and exceedingly fascinating) piece of legislation might initially seem 
unduly restrictive, but it is, in fact, precisely that focus that allows for an interrogation that 
is simultaneously granular in detail and kaleidoscopic in viewpoint, offering grounded and 
                                                          
 16. COMPTON, supra note 11, at 73–90. 
 17. See id. at 91–132. 
 18. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE 
COURT (1994). 
 19. See COMPTON, supra note 11, at 133–76. 
 20. Id. at 134. 
 21. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). 
 22. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998). 
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provocative claims about criminal justice, gender, and the intersection between them in 
the early to mid-twentieth century. With the help of rich primary sources (particularly 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) case files), Pliley illustrates how the turn to law 
enforcement to accomplish elite aims wrought changes—in government and society —far 
beyond those realms the Mann Act was intended to regulate. Indeed, it is precisely in this 
brand of moral politics through agents that we find the moral roots of the modern legal 
apparatus. 
Ostensibly a developmental history of the Mann Act, Pliley’s book sits at the nexus 
of—or, maybe, more accurately, illustrates how the Mann Act unquestionably produces 
and structures the nexus of—the creation of the FBI and the sexual behavior of women 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Also known as the White Slave Traffic Act, 
the Mann Act made it a crime to transport women or girls across state lines “for immoral 
purposes.”23 Targeted most obviously at commercial prostitution, the statute is known for 
ensnaring men from heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson to silent screen film star 
Charlie Chaplin and, perhaps, for giving rise to a story that was thought to have (at least 
partially) inspired Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita.24 In Pliley’s hands, however, it becomes 
much more: a glimpse into how “the shadow of the law” can shape political institutions 
and social behavior alike.25 Animated throughout by the leitmotif of “borders”—between 
states, between local and national authority, between public and private sexual behavior, 
between men and women, innocence and guilt, bodies and persons26—Pliley elucidates 
how a single piece of federal legislation created a “new governable sphere for sexuality” 
that allowed for and justified the expansion of an investigative law enforcement agency 
into a truly national and unquestionably powerful source of state capacity.27 
Following the changing constructions of the Mann Act—and the varying visions of 
family life and female sexuality that both shaped and emerged from those constructions—
across several decades, Pliley’s account is too exhaustive and too replete with undulations 
to recap with any semblance of completeness. At various times, the proto-FBI—it was 
known simply as the Bureau of Investigation until 1935—was confused about the meaning 
of the Mann Act,28 hesitant about enforcing it too broadly,29 overzealous in expanding its 
mandate,30 and dedicated to using it to eliminate specific kinds of sex crimes.31 Over a 
                                                          
 23. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2421–2428 (2012)).  
 24. Nabokov even name-checks the statute in the book, with Humbert Humbert noting: 
Only the other day we read in the newspapers some bunkum about a middle-aged morals offender 
who pleaded guilty to the violation of the Mann Act and to transporting a nine-year-old girl across 
state lines for immoral purposes, whatever these are. Dolores darling! You are not nine but almost 
thirteen, and I would not advise you to consider yourself my cross-country slave, and I deplore the 
Mann Act as lending itself to a dreadful pun, the revenge that the Gods of Semantics take against 
tight-zippered Philistines. 
VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA 150 (1955). 
 25. JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 216 (2014). 
 26. Id. at 3–4. 
 27. Id. at 208. 
 28. Id. at 60–83. 
 29. Id. at 84–105. 
 30. PLILEY, supra note 25, at 106–58. 
 31. See id. at 159–206. 
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roughly three-decade span, women, by turn, were seen—by agents and prosecutors, 
newspapers and social movements—as innocent victims to be protected, wartime 
distractions to be managed, sexual deviants to be prosecuted, public health dangers to be 
quarantined, and marital threats to be surveilled. Revealing how the “double standard of 
sexuality”32 that allowed male promiscuity but demanded female chastity and fidelity was 
not only an idea circulating in the populace but an output generated by law, Pliley shows 
how the formal propagation and codification of a gendered (to say nothing of racialized, 
classist, and ageist) sphere of intimacy was facilitated through bureaucratic priorities and 
coercive authority decidedly lacking in public transparency. 
Throughout it all, the transformation of the FBI, hitherto a nascent entity operating 
mostly out of Washington and with only a limited presence beyond the Northeast, into a 
nationalized, free-wheeling, strategically-managed crime-fighting organization stands out 
as a remarkable development. Against the assumption that the Bureau’s rise occurred 
largely through its work in “domestic political policing of ideological and racial 
minorities,”33 Pliley sees the story of sexual policing of women as fundamental to the 
growth of institutional functions, individuals, and resources. The creation of the White 
Slave Division—and the establishment of “white slave officers,” a veritable army of 
deputized civilian volunteers, within it—is a telling microcosm of the broader story.34 
Charged with the “overwhelming, if unclear, task of policing immorality” nationwide, the 
Bureau’s augmented jurisdiction would ultimately lead to more agents to track down the 
purveyors of vice and, subsequently, to more money to aid them in ferreting out sin.35 In 
the end, it was a group of “subnational bureaucratic actors” that spread “federal polic[e] 
power throughout much of the country,” establishing both the structural architecture of 
and a “more aggressive model” for ensuring that the nation’s laws were enforced, and 
majority’s moral values imposed, upon the citizenry as a whole.36 
BUILDING THE AMERICAN VICE STATE 
Even though Volk, Compton, and Pliley clearly did not write their books to be in 
formal conversation with one another, they fit remarkably well together—not merely as 
different case studies of a common theme or different manifestations of a common 
dynamic, but as interlocking pieces of grand historical trajectory: the construction of the 
American vice state. With Volk, Compton, and Pliley’s books as our guides, it is more 
possible than ever to sketch out the complex, multi-generational, multi-stage development 
of a regime that persists, albeit in modified and amended form, even to this day. Laying 
the books’ insights on top of (rather than merely adjacent to) one another, I can identify at 
least five sequential processes at work. 
First, ideologically, there was the public construction or framing of certain 
undesirable behaviors as “vice” in the first place. Occurring during periods when 
American values were decidedly in flux, with a clash between first a lingering Puritan 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 5. 
 33. Id. at 8. 
 34. Id. at 88–98. 
 35. PLILEY, supra note 25, at 87. 
 36. Id. at 91, 104. 
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sensibility and later an emerging Victorian morality, on the one hand, and an incipient 
proto-libertarianism animating political culture, on the other hand, Volk, Compton, and 
Pliley highlight moments that proved ripe for reinterpreting and renegotiating the norms 
and values of the extant political order. The idea that moral weakness—the propensity to 
ingest harmful substances, to engage in financially profligate activity, to participate in 
sexually deviant behavior—was itself societally detrimental may have fit quite naturally 
within strands of political thinking that emphasized communal betterment, but it was 
hardly self-evident or universally accepted in a society usually characterized as uniformly 
liberal. Instead, the public costs of private sin needed to be articulated, dramatized, and 
inculcated. And, indeed, by framing vice as both a blight on individual capacity and a drain 
on social resources in newspapers, literature, and popular culture, reformers transformed 
what might otherwise simply have been considered personal problems of immorality into 
a civic problem with sufficient political and economic ramifications so as to render it an 
appropriate target of popular opprobrium and governmental supervision. 
Second, organizationally, there were activist campaigns—directed at both national 
and sub-national policymakers—to leverage such attention in service of proposing 
concrete and tangible action. As Volk, Compton, and Pliley illustrate, many such 
campaigns came from familiar social reformers and the organizations they left behind, but 
at least some of the campaigns (especially in the Gilded Age) appear to have been funded 
by the very breed of wealthy capitalists that would—and did—abhor interventionist 
government when it turned its regulatory gaze toward business and industry. The 
combination of these forces provided a powerful one-two punch of activist mobilization 
and elite bankrolling that left campaigns for vice regulation well positioned not only to 
make noise but also to achieve results. 
Third, legislatively, there were seemingly endless local, state, and eventually 
congressional battles to secure those results by drafting and enacting city ordinances, state 
constitutional amendments, and federal legislation that might simultaneously serve to 
satisfy the interests of reformers and further the aims of legislators alike. While the 
regulation of moral peccadilloes had long been subject to the sorts of state laws and 
especially local ordinances integral to Volk and Compton’s analyses, it was only in the 
late nineteenth century that the trend jumped to the federal level. Indeed, influenced by an 
array of groups in favor of reform-minded policymaking and capitalizing on public panics 
about the societal victims of so-called “victimless crimes,” lawmakers sought not so much 
to overcome as to bolster state policies and formulate a comprehensive approach to the 
moral—and, by extension, political, economic, and social—decay of Americans. The 
answer, as the central characters in both Compton and Pliley’s stories saw it, lay in national 
standards with national enforcement; it lay, in other words, in a programmatic approach to 
extinguishing vice through nationwide regulation. 
Fourth, jurisprudentially, there was the judicial—and, indeed, ultimately Supreme 
Court—sanctioning, or constitutionalizing, of that regulation as part of a vision that 
seemed to push, both creatively and expansively, the bounds of national regulatory 
authority. Central to this construction, as Compton details, was a constitutional universe 
that integrated established understandings of governmental power, federalism, and judicial 
authority into a powerful and theretofore unseen admixture. Combining these elements in 
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service of something roughly approximating an unenumerated federal police power to 
regulate for the health and morals of the citizenry, the Court effectively rendered claims 
that vice regulation lacked legal legitimacy moot and provided a constitutional imprimatur 
for the notion that national government could join state and local governments in seeking 
to rid the American citizenry of sin. 
Fifth, administratively, there was the enforcement, by local and federal officials 
alike, of a broad and expansive conception of not only the targets of (judicially-approved) 
statutes regulating immoral behavior but also their mandates for action under them. As 
Pliley documents, this process both lent enormous leeway to and placed enormous pressure 
upon police forces, federal agents (as well as the civilians deputized by them), and 
attorneys to identify, trap, and punish those trafficking in vice. The need for investigative 
energy required an expansion of resources—both money and manpower; the demand for 
prosecutorial success necessitated a wide net, “flexible” tactics, and unified purpose 
dictated from the top. Together, they transformed national bureaucratic capacity on 
criminal justice matters so as to make vice not merely regulable in theory but actually 
punishable in practice. 
From demand to mobilization, provision to legitimation to implementation, there is 
a fascinating, complex, and, until now, largely unappreciated story of political 
development unfolding here. Indeed, considered not as independent vectors but as 
overlapping, sequential stages in a macro-political transformation, these five processes—
framing, proposing, enacting, constitutionalizing, enforcing—yield nothing less than an 
expansive, interventionist, regulatory government, one that both helps to contextualize the 
transformation of the political order that comes three decades later with the New Deal and 
establishes a legacy that remains visible in American politics to this day. 
One broader lesson here—not one that Volk, Compton, or Pliley drive home directly 
but one that implicitly jumps out from the shared force of their work all the same—is that 
our standard narrative about the origins of “modern” American life overemphasizes the 
economic at the expense of the social. To be sure, questions of political economy were 
instrumental in the development of the contemporary American state, but the path to the 
New Deal economic order is not one fundamentally about economic regulation because 
the ideational, organizational, legislative, jurisprudential, and administrative roots of the 
New Deal economic order reside in the realm of social control. This story of deep concern 
with non-economic aspects of community life—what citizens are accepted as members of 
the community, the responsibilities citizens have to their communities, the privileges and 
benefits citizens receive from their communities in return—is largely forgotten once the 
New Deal’s thoroughgoing transformation of the government’s role in the national 
economy becomes the story of how modern American politics works. But, reading Volk, 
Compton, and Pliley, it is hard to escape the idea that the economic concerns about 
planning and regulation in a capitalist system are intimately linked to the social dimensions 
of how people behave and practice their everyday lives. The notion that there are social 
roots of economic structures—that the logic of social regulation suggests a logic for 
economic regulation later, that the campaigns for social regulation guide campaigns for 
economic regulation later, that the justification for social regulation establishes a 
justification for economic regulation later—is not necessarily how we conceptualize things 
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today. But, to the extent that New Deal economic interventionism can be traced to the 
social control initiatives—the morals regulation, the vice state—from the Age of Jackson 
to the Progressive Era, it was the directionality of the relationship during a wide swath of 
American history. 
As central as social control has been to American political history, it should be little 
surprise that it remains an integral domain of contemporary American government. After 
all, the American vice state whose historical roots are under examination in these books 
has endured as, in many eyes, a profoundly illiberal policy regime for more than a century. 
Alcohol may have recovered from Prohibition to become an accepted feature of American 
life, but the other two sites of moral politics that undergird much of these books—
gambling and prostitution—remain, to different degrees and in different ways, outside the 
mainstream. Gambling, though obviously somewhat destigmatized with the rise of state-
sponsored lotteries in the mid-twentieth century and the prevalence of tribal gaming in the 
late twentieth century, remains illegal in most forms (casinos or sports betting, for 
example) in most states as well as federally, with recent flare-ups in a number of states 
over the classification of “daily fantasy sports.” Prostitution, a condoned sexual practice 
in much of the developed world, remains contrary to the laws of the United States as well 
as every American state save Nevada. And for all the many nodes of debauchery and 
depravity that fill the pages of Volk, Compton, and Pliley’s books, there is an important 
one that does not make an appearance: recreational drugs.37 Perhaps the primary target of 
the contemporary vice state, drugs remain—recent electoral successes in legalizing 
marijuana in a number of states notwithstanding—legally prohibited, culturally decried, 
and harshly punished at both the state and federal level. 
That the continued potency of such a regime persists as a source of controversy 
should not be the least bit surprising given the various strands of American liberalism it 
imperils. For some, the subjects regulated and the behavior proscribed not only reside 
within the bounds of what many Americans have long deemed private morality and what 
others would at least regard as “victimless” crimes but also present opportunities for 
exacerbating racial and socioeconomic inequities that already run rampant throughout the 
criminal justice system. For others, the very existence of a vice state is proof positive of 
how easily the federal government—purportedly one of enumerated powers only—can use 
its creative capacities to accomplish something it might not otherwise be constitutionally 
empowered to do. To politicians, pundits, and (presumably) much of the populace, those 
dueling concerns might suggest a dispute that is inescapably a product of our 
hyperpolarized era rather than one that has been raging on-and-off for nearly two centuries, 
shaping and constituting American political debate, constitutionalism, and institutions in 
the process. Yet, far from a creation of Ronald Reagan or the Christian Coalition, the 
American vice state has roots deep in our historical consciousness and influence far across 
the political agenda. Amidst morally-tinged questions about governmental obligations in 
healthcare and personal safety, and in light of morally-drenched debates about abortion 
                                                          
 37. Indeed, if one were looking for something to add to the works under examination here, it would be a book 
detailing the historical political development of narcotics, which were similarly characterized by everything from 
impassioned campaigns to aggressive enforcement and are, as seen in the “War on Drugs,” similarly durable as 
an aspect of the vice state. 
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and gay rights, we would be wise to recognize—and, subsequently, to learn from—the 
moral roots of the modern American polity. 
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